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All parties to this proceeding are listed in the caption.
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

||

Petitioner submits the following questions to the Supreme
Court for review:
1.

Has the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in this case

that has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of supervision, when the Court of Appeals, in this
case stated that petitioner's claim for permanent total disability
compensation was cut off before that claim had actually accrued,
thus, stating that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) is, de facto

a

statute of repose; nevertheless, the Court of Appeals denied Mr.
Vigos' claim because it was "bound to follow" the Court of Appeals'
prior decision in Avis v. Board of Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App.
1992), which decision some members of the panel disagree with?
2.

Is the Court of Appeals' decision in this case in

conflict with prior decisions of the Supreme Court and other
decisions of different panels of the Court of Appeals on the issue
of whether there is continuing jurisdiction and how the Industrial
Commission first obtains jurisdiction?
|

REFERENCE TO OFFICIAL REPORT

||

The Court of Appeals' opinion in this case was issued on March
13,

1997 and

is attached

as

"Appendix A".

The

Industrial

Commission's Denial of Motion for Review, is attached as "Appendix
B".

ALJ's order is attached as "Appendix C".
1

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeal's decision was filed on March 13, 1997.
The time within which to file a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
expires on April 15, 1997. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to
review the decision of the Court of Appeals by writ of certiorari
under Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(3) (1992), and pursuant to Rules 45-51
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF LAW
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 7:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
Utah Constitution, Article I, § 11:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an
injury done to him in his person, property or reputation,
shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no
person shall be barred from prosecuting or defending
before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel,
any civil cause to which he is a party.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1):
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an
industrial accident, the employee
shall receive
compensation as outlined in this section.
Permanent
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a
finding by the commission of total disability, as
measured by the substance of the sequential decisionmaking process of the Social Security Administration
under Title 2 0 of the Code of Federal Regulations as
revised. The commission shall adopt rules that conform
to the substance of the sequential decision-making
process of the Social Security Administration under 2 0
C.F.R. Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), and (f) (1)
and (2), as revised.

2
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The powers and jurisdictioi i of the commissioi 1 ov er each
case shall be continuing. The commission, after notice
and hearing, may from time to time modify or change its
former findings and order. Records pertaining to cases
that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other
than cases of total permanent disability or cases in
which a claim has been filed as in Section 35-1-99, may
be destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(3):
(a) "This section may not be interpreted a* modifying in
any respect the statutes of limitations contained in
other sections of this chapter or Chapter v. Title 3r»,
the Utah Occupational Disease Disability 1
(b) The commission has no power to change LIIL statutes
of limitation referred to in Subsection ' -* in any
respect.
Utah Code Ann

:

A claim for compensation tor temporary total disability
benefits, temporary
partial
disability benefits,
permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an
application for hearing is filed with the industrl ?!
Commission within six years after the date of inc
accident.
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disabled and had not performed any gainful employment as of January
1, 1993. (R. 23-5) On July 10, 1995, 17 days after he received the
social security determination, Mr. Vigos filed his application for
hearing

with

the

Industrial

disability benefits.

Commission

for

permanent

total

(R. 13).

Pursuant to defendant's motion to dismiss, the ALJ dismissed
the claim because it was filed more than six years after Mr. Vigos
fell.

(R. 61-2)

Mr. Vigos disputed the ALJ's order and filed a

Motion for Review within 30 days of the ALJ's Order and in
accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§35-1-82.53 (1) (1988) 63-46b-12
(l)(a)

(1992).

(R. 64)

On March

Commission affirmed the ALJ's order.

28, 1996 the

Industrial

(R. 117-9) On April 25, 1996

Mr. Vigos filed his Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
(R. 121) On March 13, 1997 the Court of Appeals denied Mr. Vigos'
Petition.
B.

Statement of Facts

Mr. Vigos was employed by defendant Mountainland Builders,
Inc. (Mountainland) on October 13, 1988. (R. 1, 13) While working
on a plank, Mr. Vigos

fell and

sustained

several injuries,

including a head injury, while acting within the course and scope
of his employment.

(R. 1, 13, 38, and 39)

Mountainland's

insurance carrier, the Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah (the
Fund), last paid medical expenses in July of 1989 and benefits from
October 14, 1988 to May 8, 1989 as a result of this accident.

(R.

38, 39) Mr. Vigos was given neither an impairment rating for this
4
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Thei':- i.va,r-: d tcictiaal dispute as to when Mr. Vigos became permanently
totally disabled because the Industrial Commission dismissed Mr. Vigos' claim
without a hearing.
Applicant asserted it was after the six year statute of
limitations and defendants claimed it was about 4 ^ years after Mr. Vigos fell.
The Court of Appeals determined that it was after the six year statute of
limitations had run, although the Court of Appeals gave no explanation as to how it
came to this conclusion. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals could have relied on
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123, 124 n.2 (Utah App. 1992), which states
that when the Commission dismisses a petitioner's claim without a full hearing on
the facts, "we presume, to the extent necessary to resolve the issues on appeal,
that the facts are as stated by petitioner."

5

denied after the October 28, 1994 request.

(R. 30) Consequently,

it is unclear as to when Mr. Vigos became permanently totally
disabled.

After a Social Security Administrative hearing in May,

1995, Mr. Vigos was awarded Social Security benefits on June 23,
1995 and the Social Security Administration determined that Mr.
Vigos had not been gainfully employed since January 1, 1993.
23-25)

(R.

On July 10, 1995, Mr. Vigos applied for permanent total

disability benefits with the Industrial Commission.

(R. 13) The

Fund claimed that Mr. Vigos' application was filed after the
statute of limitations had lapsed and moved for dismissal.

(R. 39)

On September 18, 1995 the ALJ dismissed Vigos' application with
prejudice.

(R. 61-2)

October 16, 1995.

Mr. Vigos filed a Motion for Review on

(R. 64)

On March 28, 1996 the Industrial

Commission affirmed the ALJ's order.

(R. 117-9) On April 25, 1996

Mr. Vigos filed his Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals.
(R. 121)

The Court of Appeals denied his Petition for Review on

March 13, 1997. Mr. Vigos has timely filed this Petition for Writ
of Certiorari.
///
///
///
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I

ARGUMENT

POINT

J

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD
BE POSSIBLE TO CONCLUDE THAT UTAH CODE ANN. §351-99(3) IS A STATUTE OF REPOSE BECAUSE MR. VIGOS'
CLAIM WAS CUT OFF BEFORE IT HAD ACCRUED
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS FORCED TO FOLLOW A
POOR PRECEDENT IN RULING THAT MR. VIGOS' COULD
NOT BRING A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
The law is well settled in Utah that if a person's right to
bring a claim is cut off by statute before that claim has accrued
then the statute is a statute of repose.

"A statute of repose . .

. prevents suit a statutorily specified number of years after a
particular event occurs, without regard to when the cause of action
accrues." Velarde v. Industrial Comm'n, 831 P.2d 123, 125 (Utah
App. 1992); see also,

Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670

(Utah 1985); Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Associates, 910 P.2d 1252
(Utah App. 1996); Hales v. Industrial ComnTn., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah
App. 1993). A statute of repose violates a person's constitutional
rights because it violates the due process provision and the open
courts provision of the Utah Constitution, Article I, §§ 7 and 11.
In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals concluded that the
controlling statute "cut off petitioner's claim for permanent total
disability compensation before that claim had actually accrued,
i.e., before petitioner was totally disabled."

However, because a

different Court of Appeals' panel, in Avis v. Board of Review, 837
7

P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), had determined that the same statute was
a statute of limitations, the Court of Appeals deemed itself
powerless to rule otherwise in this case. The Court simply stated,
"Whether each member of this panel agrees with the rationale and
analysis of Avis is beside the point, as we are bound to follow
this precedent,"

Therefore, the Court of Appeals rendered a

decision in this case that has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise
of the Supreme Court's power of supervision.

B. UNTIL A PERSON BECOMES DISABLED HE CANNOT
SUCCESSFULLY BRING A CLAIM FOR PERMANENT TOTAL
DISABILITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: HENCE,
DISABILITY IS THE LAST EVENT TO OCCUR IN THE
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY
Utah Code Ann. § 35-l-99(3)2, states:
A claim for compensation for temporary total disability
benefits,
temporary
partial
disability
benefits,
permanent partial disability benefits, or permanent total
disability benefits is wholly barred, unless an
application for hearing is filed with the Industrial
Commission within six years after the date of the
accident.
Id.

Permanent total disability differs from temporary total

disability, temporary partial disability, and permanent partial
disability because permanent total disability has an additional
requirement before an injured employee can obtain benefits: the
employee must suffer both an injury and the inability to work after
medical stabilization.

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-67(1) states:

Since Mr. Vigos' accident, this statute has been repealed; however, the
current statute of limitations, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2), uses nearly the same
language as Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3).

8

(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an
industrial accident, the employee shall receive
compensation as outlined in this section.
Permanent
total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a
finding by the commission of total disability, as
measured by the substance of the sequential decisionmaking process of the Social Security Administration
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as
revised. (Emphasis added).
Id.

The Commission

sets forth the required

"questions and

evaluations to be made in sequence" for a claim of permanent total
disability.

The questions and evaluations are as follows:

1.
Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful
activity?
2.
Does the claimant have a medically severe
impairment?
3.
Does the severe impairment meet or equal the
duration requirement in 20 CFR 404.15093, amended April
1, 1993, and the listed impairments in 2 0 CFR Subpart P
Appendix 1, amended April 1, 1993?
4.
Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing
past relevant work?
5.
Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing
any other work?
Utah Administrative Code Rule R568-1-17. Consequently, as long as
an employee is still working, despite his injury, he cannot apply
for

permanent

total

disability

benefits

because

he

is

not

statutorily disabled.
The legislature did not intend to require an employee to file
a claim for permanent total disability within six years of the
"accident" if he did not meet the statutory requirements for
§

404.1509 states:

How long the impairment must last.
Unless your impairment is expected to result in death, it must have lasted or
must be expected to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. We call this
the duration requirement. (Emphasis added).

9

disability.

To require an employee to file before he had a claim

runs contrary to the statutory construction and well established
Utah law.

In Nixon v. Salt Lake City Corp., 898 P.2d 265 (Utah

1995), the Supreme Court stated:
"'The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to
give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of
the purpose the statute was meant to achieve.'" . . . .
Although we generally rely on the plain language rule of
statutory construction, . . . . we note that an equally
important rule of statutory construction is that a
statute should be construed as a whole, with all of its
provisions construed to be harmonious with each other and
with the overall legislative objective of the statute. .
. . (Emphasis added and cites omitted).
Id. at 2 68.

The statute of limitations for permanent total

disability cannot begin to run until the claimant has an injury and
can no longer work.

Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.42(d).

In Larson's treatise, he states that a statute of limitations
should not begin to run until a claimant is aware that he has a
claim.

Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.41 states:

The time period for notice or claim does not begin to
run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, should
recognize
the
nature,
seriousness
and
probable
compensable character of his injury or disease.
(Emphasis added).
Id.

Larson's Workmen's Compensation, §78.42(a) also states:
A rigid claims period may operate unfairly not only
because the nature, seriousness, and work-connection of
the injury could not reasonably be recognized by the
claimant, or perhaps even by the claimant's doctor, but
in many cases because the injury itself does not exist in
compensable degree during the claims period. This latent
or delayed injury problem presents in the sharpest relief
the senselessness of uncompromising time periods. The
classic illustration is that of the apparently trivial
accident that matures into a disabling injury after the
claim period has expired. A worker is struck in the eye
by a metal chip, but both he and the company doctors
10

dismiss the accident as a petty one and of course no
claim is made, since there is no present injury or
disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops as
the direct result of the accident. If the statute bars
claims filed more than one year after the "accident," and
if the court applies the statutory language with
draconian literalism, the worker can never collect for
the injury no matter how diligent he is: he cannot claim
during the year, because no compensable injury exists; he
cannot claim after the year, because the statute runs
from the accident. (Emphasis added).
Id.

The language used by Larson applies to all "uncompromising

time periods," not just a one year time period.

Larson then uses

a one year statute of limitation as "[t]he classic illustration .
..."

Larson is criticizing every statute of limitation that has

uncompromising time periods, not just a one year statute of
limitations.
The Court of Appeals stated, in this case, that Mr. Vigos'
claim for permanent total disability was cut off before it had
accrued; however, because of the decision of Avis v. Board of
Review, 837 P.2d 584 (Utah App. 1992), the Court of Appeals felt
trapped and denied Mr. Vigos his rightful benefits. Any claim that
falls under this statute or the current Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2),
where the employee has a delayed onset of injury after the
"accident" will make both §35-1-99(3) and §35-1-98(2) statutes of
repose, especially if the Court of Appeals' decision in Avis and
its progeny is allowed to stand, then the Industrial Commission
will

continue

to

interpret

the

statutes

with

"draconian

literalism."
Also, a claim for permanent total disability is more akin to
a death benefits claim because the likelihood of delayed onset is
11

so great.

In Hales v. Industrial Comm'n., 854 P.2d 537 (Utah App.

1993), the applicant claimed, and the Industrial Commission agreed
with the applicant and stated in its order, "that the statutory
provision in section 35-1-68(2) violated the Utah Constitution's
open

courts

constitutional

provision
right

to

by

extinguishing

litigate

a valid

[the

applicant's]

claim

before

[the

applicant's] right to file that claim arose." The Court of Appeals
came to the same conclusion.
issue in this case.

Xd. at 542.

That is exactly the

It does not matter if Hales concerned a

different statute or different benefits, which is the distinction
the Court of Appeals tries to make. Mr. Vigos' right to litigate
his valid claim was extinguished before his right to file the claim
arose, which makes Utah Code Ann. §35-1-98(2) unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals has left Mr. Vigos with no remedy at all.
Therefore, this Court should review Avis and its progeny and grant
petitioner's writ of certiorari.

POINT

II

ONCE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION
IT CAN MODIFY OR ADJUST AN AWARD IN ACCORDANCE
WITH CHANGES IN CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH COULD
INCLUDE
A
DETERIORATION
OF
THE
FORMER
EMPLOYEE'S CONDITION OR THE DISCOVERY OF A
PREVIOUSLY UNNOTICED INJURY.

When t h e Court of Appeals denied Mr. Vigos'

petition,

it

f a i l e d t o discuss Utah Code Ann. §35-1-78(1), which s t a t e s , "The
powers and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the commission over each case s h a l l be
continuing."

The Court of Appeals' decision in t h i s case i s in
12

conflict with prior decisions of the Supreme Court and other
decisions of different panels of the Court of Appeals on the issue
of whether there is continuing jurisdiction and how the Industrial
Commission first obtains jurisdiction; therefore, this Court should
grant the petition for writ of certiorari.
The language in §35-1-78(1) is clear and unambiguous, once
jurisdiction

has

been

invoked

over

a

case,

the

Industrial

Commission has continuing jurisdiction over that case.

In Utah

State Ins. Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982), the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
Notwithstanding the fact that the foregoing statutes
[§§35-1-99 -100] require either the filing of a claim for
compensation or the filing of a written notice of the
accident in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the
Commission, this Court has long recognized that a claim
for compensation need not bear any particular formality.
In fact, "great liberality as to form and substance of an
application for compensation is to be indulged." However
informal the claim may be, it need only give "notice to
the parties and to the Commission of the material facts
on which the right asserted is to depend and against whom
claim is made." (Emphasis added).
Id. at 709 (footnotes omitted).

Although §§35-1-99 and 35-1-100

were repealed and §35-1-99(3) controls in this case, §35-1-99(3)
does not overrule Dutson. Dutson is still good law and it applies
to this case. In Dutson the applicant had not filed anything with
the Industrial Commission. However, in Dutson, the employer filed
the "'Employer's First Report of Injury' . . . , the attending
physician

. . . filed 'Medical Report', . . . and . . . [the]

State Insurance Fund filed 'Notice: Payment of Temporary Disability
Compensation as per Utah Code (35-1-65) . . . .'"
13

The Commission has continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos'
case for the following reasons:

1) the employer filed with the

Commission an "Employer's Report of Injury" (R. 001, 035), 2) the
treating physician filed a "Physician's Initial Report of Work
Injury," (R. 034), and, 3) the Fund paid benefits to Mr. Vigos.
(R. 39)

In fact, in the Fund's Amended Answer to the Application

for Hearing, the Fund stated, "The Workers Compensation Fund
acknowledges the occurrence of Mr. Vigos [sic] industrial accident
on October 13, 1988, but unfortunately it appears Mr. Vigos [sic]
claim for additional benefits was not timely filed."

(R. 39) The

Fund then states, "The Fund originally accepted liability for Mr.
Vigos' accident . . . ."

(R. 39)

Mr. Vigos acknowledges the language in §35-1-78(3) that states
the Commission cannot modify statutes of limitations.

However,

this does not create a problem. If an employee has an accident and
an injury, which does not have a delayed onset, notifies his
employer, but fails to make a claim for benefits, then he cannot
later try and make a claim through the "back door" by claiming
continuing jurisdiction. On the other hand, if a timely claim has
been filed and benefits paid, then the Commission has jurisdiction
over every subsequent claim, regardless of the onset, and the
statute of limitations does not apply.
This is consistent with Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund
of Utah

889 P.2d 409 (Utah 1994), wherein this Court stated:

Nevertheless, Stoker may still have a remedy under the
Act. It would be ironic for the Act to be construed in
such a fashion that a worker who undertakes a
14

conservative course of therapy within the time allowed by
the statute, which if effective would save the Fund money
and be less risky to the worker, would be denied benefits
when that course proves ineffective and a more aggressive
therapy must then be pursued, resulting in temporary
total disability that occurs outside the eight-year
period. Had the more aggressive therapy been undertaken
at the time of the less aggressive therapy, Stoker would
have met the requirements for additional total disability
benefits.
Id. at 412. This Court then concluded that even though it was more
than eight years post

injury, the Commission

had continuing

jurisdiction and Stoker could file a claim under §35-1-78(1). Id.
Additionally, in Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah
1996), in footnote 2, the Supreme Court stated:
The provision granting the Commission continuing
jurisdiction
emphasizes
the
exclusivity
of
the
Commission's jurisdiction over workers' compensation
claims. Under general common law doctrine, the entry of
a judgment for damages based on personal injuries would
bar subsequent actions based on the same injury. Such is
not the case under the Act. The Commission is empowered
to adjust the award in accordance with changes in
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-78. Such changes
could include a deterioration of the former employee's
condition or the discovery of a previously unnoticed
injury. See, e.g., Stoker v. Workers' Compensation Fund,
889 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1994) (commission can reopen case
if previously used conservative method of treatment
proved ineffective); Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial
Comm'n, 103 Utah 371, 135 P.2d 266 (1943) (commission may
reconsider case if there has been some new development
that suggests award may have been excessive or
inadequate); Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n/
60 Utah 553, 210 P. 611 (1922) (commission authorized to
alter award when amputated leg failed to heal
sufficiently to use prosthesis). (Emphasis added).
Id. at 775.
It would not only be ironic, but inequitable, for injured
workers to return to the work force for six years or more and then
15

be told that they should not have made a good faith effort, but,
instead, should have applied for permanent total disability. Such
rulings will have a chilling effect on injured workers to return to
the work force because they are punished, instead of rewarded, if
they attempt to stay in the work force for more than six years from
the date of the initial injury. Alternatively, workers may have to
file for benefits before a claim has accrued, which then raises a
fundamental question about Rule 11 sanctions for these filings.
For example, suppose I have a client who is a truck driver and
he was in a fight on May 21, 1992 while protecting his cargo.4 He
gets severely beaten, suffers from post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD) and his employer denies benefits. I file an application for
hearing

for

temporary

total

disability,

permanent

partial

disability, interest, and medical bills, but I do not make the
claim for permanent total disability because he has returned to
work, even though he was given an impairment rating of 15% for his
physical injuries and 15% for his PTSD. Now suppose this case goes
all the way to the Court of Appeals, which grants the employee
everything that was requested and this Court denies a petition for
writ of certiorari.

Next, suppose that four years post accident

the employee has a relapse that results in him missing three
additional months of work and this is medically attributed to the

The facts of this hypothetical are based upon the case of Commercial
Carriers v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 888 P.2d 707 (Utah App. 1994) . By citing
these facts I am not trying to inappropriately supplement the record. With the
current status of the Vigos decision applicant attorneys are placed in unenviable
position of having to predict if a client will be permanently totally disabled
before the six year statute runs. Naturally, if the attorney makes an incorrect
evaluation, then the attorney could be faced with a malpractice claim.
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May 21, 1992 accident; however, the employee again returns to work.
Then suppose, the doctor gives me a letter in January, 1997, nearly
five years post injury, that states, in essence:
My prognoses for this gentleman is guarded, at best.
Because he suffers from an extreme case of PTSD he may
not be able to work again if he has another breakdown.
He continues to drive a truck because he loves to drive
and he finds comfort in being inside his truck. At the
same time, however, the driving of his truck is a strong
contributor to his PTSD. I will continue to see him once
a month and I hope that he can continue to work.
As the six year anniversary approaches I am placed in a very
precarious position.

Do I advise my client to continue working,

which he loves to do, or do I tell him that he should quit, because
if he has a relapse on May 22, 1998 his claim for permanent total
disability is gone forever, even though the insurance company has
paid all of his medical and all of his benefits?

Another

possibility is to go ahead and file simply to preserve the claim.
Unless the Industrial Commission has continuing jurisdiction,
claimants will be at a huge disadvantage.

Such a situation runs

contrary to the Supreme Court's ruling that:
The Workmen's Compensation Act is to be construed
liberally to further the statutory purposes of providing
relief from injuries caused by industrial accidents. . .
. The Industrial Commission is in the first instance
responsible for effectuating the purposes of the Act by
construing its provisions to secure its humane
objectives. (Cite omitted).
Pinter Constr. Co. v. Frisbv, 678 P.2d 305, 306 (Utah 1984).
In the present case, the parties clearly had notice of the
material facts and the Industrial Commission was given notice.
Once the employee meets this burden then the Commission has
jurisdiction.

Once it has jurisdiction, it can modify any prior
17

awards, which

would

include

a

"deterioration

of

the

former

employee's condition or the discovery of a previously unnoticed
injury."

Sheppick v. Albertson's, Inc. 922 P.2d 769 (Utah 1996),

footnote 2.
When the employer has filed a first report of injury with the
Industrial Commission, the doctor's first report of injury is also
filed with the Industrial Commission, the insurance company accepts
liability and then cooperates with the injured employee, there is
no need to file a formal application for hearing.

That is why

Dutson is still good law and applies to this case. How else would
the Industrial Commission ever get jurisdiction in a case where the
employer and the employee are cooperating for a full six years
after the Industrial Commission has been given written notice? The
Court of Appeals' decision in this case would require an applicant
to file a formal application for hearing on every claim, regardless
of the cooperation between the parties.
law.

This is contrary to Utah

see Stoker, 889 P.2d at 412. Currently, with this decision,

the Industrial Commission does not have jurisdiction unless an
employee files an application for hearing for every claim.
The Court of Appeals' decision in this case goes far beyond
the well established law of Utah concerning the purpose of the
Worker's Compensation Act.

In Norton v. The Industrial Comm'n.,

728 P.2d 1025, 1028 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court stated, "[i]t
need

not

be

restated

at

great

length

that

the

Workmen's

Compensation Act is to be liberally construed and that any doubt
respective the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of
18

the iniured employee."

Id. (emphasis added).

Therefore, the

Commission should have continuing jurisdiction in this case or else
the statute will be construed so narrowly that Mr. Vigos will be
left with no remedy.

Hence, this Court should grant Mr. Vigos'

petition for writ of certiorari.
CONCLUSION
Even though Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) cut off Mr. Vigos'
claim before it had accrued, the Court of Appeals, because it felt
it was bound by Avis, states it is a statute of limitations. The
Court of Appeals has made a distinction without a difference by
stating that Utah Code Ann. §35-1-99(3) is a statute of limitations
that acts like a statute of repose. It appears as though the Court
of Appeals is stating, "It looks like a rose, it feels like a rose,
and it smells like a rose; however, it must be a carnation." Yet,
a rose, by any other name, is still a rose. Utah Code Ann. §35-199(3) looks like a statute of repose, feels like a statute of
repose, and acts like a statute of repose; therefore, it must be a
statute of repose and this Court must grant certiorari because Avis
and its progeny are denying good, hard working people their
constitutional right to pursue their benefits.
Likewise, there must be continuing jurisdiction.

If the

Industrial Commission does not have continuing jurisdiction when
the parties cooperate and the employer/insurance carrier accepts
liability and pays benefits, then the Industrial Commission will
never have jurisdiction. Alternatively, the Industrial Commission
19

will be deluged with claims even for the slightest of injury,
simply to preserve any potential claims.

Therefore, this Court

should grant the petition for writ of certiorari because the Court
of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's
power of supervision.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 14th day of April, 1997.

EUGgtfE C. MILLER, JR.
/
Attorney for Applicant/Petitioner
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Teresa J. Mareck
Worker's Compensation Fund of Utah
P.O. Box 57929
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0929
Alan Hennebold
Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

EU^EIjtf C. MILLER, JR.
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Petitioner
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FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COURT OF APPEALS

ooOoo
J. David Vigos,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For Official Publication)

Petitioner,
v.

Case No. 960283-CA

Industrial Commission of Utah;
Mountainland Builders, Inc.;
and Workers' Compensation Fund
of Utah,

F I L E D
(March 1 3 , 1997)

Respondents.

Original Proceeding in this Court
Attorneys:

Eugene C. Miller, Jr., Salt Lake City, for Petitioner
Alan Hennebold, Salt Lake City, for Respondent
Industrial Commission
Richard G. Sumsion and Teresa J. Mareck, Salt Lake
City, for Respondents Mountainland Builders and
Workers' Compensation

Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Employing the logic of Hales v. Industrial Comm'n, 854 P.2d
537 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), it would be possible to conclude that
the statute in issue here is a statute of repose because it cut
off petitioner's claim for permanent total disability
compensation before that claim had actually accrued, i.e., before
petitioner was totally disabled. However, Hales concerns another
kind of benefit and a different statute. Id. at 539.
The case of Avis v. Board of Review. 837 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992), involves claims for permanent partial disability, id.
at 585; essentially the same statute, id. at 586 n.2; and facts
which, while different, are not legally distinguishable. See id.
at 585. Whether each member of this panel agrees with the
rationale and analysis of Avis is beside the point, as we are
bound to follow this precedent. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993).

Avis concludes that the statute is a statute of limitations
that runs from the time of injury, so long as petitioner knew of
the injury, even the ah petitioner did not realize the extent of
the injury and its permanent impact until the statute had run.
Avi7. 837 P.2d at 588. Given Avis, we are obligated to affirm
the Industrial Commission's order denying petitioner's motion for
review of the administrative law judge's order of dismissal.
Affirmed,

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

960283-CA

2
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
J, DAVID VIGOS,
Applicant/

*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

Case No. 95-0597

vs.
MOUNTAIN BUILDERS, INC.
and THE WORKERS COMPENSATION
FUND OF UTAH,
Defendants.

J. David Vigos asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to
review the Administrative Law Judge!s dismissal of Mr. Vigos' claim
for benefits under the Utah Workers1 Compensation Act.
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this
motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW
Is Mr. Vigos' claim barred by the statute of limitations found
in §35-1-98(2) of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The facts material to the foregoing issue are not in dispute.
Mr. Vigos alleges an industrial injury occurring on October 12,
1988. He filed his claim for workers' compensation benefits with
the Industrial Commission on July 11, 1995.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
J. DAVID VIGOS
PAGE 2
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Since July 1 1988, the Utah Workers' Compensation Act has
required injured workers to file their claims for disability
compensation with the Commission within six years from the date of
their industrial accidents. This statute of limitations, now found
in §35-1-98(2) of the Act, provides in material part as follows:
A claim for compensation for temporary total
disability
benefits,
temporary
partial
disability
benefits, permanent partial disability benefits, or
permanent total disability benefits is barred, unless an
application for hearing is filed with the commission
within six years after the date of the accident.
Under the plain language of the foregoing statute, Mr. Vigos'
claim was barred when he failed to file it with the Industrial
Commission within six years from the date of his accident. The
Industrial Commission is compelled to conclude, as did the ALJ,
that Mr. Vigos claim must be dismissed.
In reaching this conclusion, the Industrial Commission has
considered Mr. Vigos' arguments, but finds them unpersuasive. The
appellate decisions cited by Mr. Vigos were not decided under the
provisions of §35-1-98(2) and are of no value as precedent in this
case.
As to the argument that the Industrial Commission has
continuing jurisdiction over Mr. Vigos' claim, such jurisdiction
attaches only when a timely application for benefits has been
filed.
In this case, Mr. Vigos' application was untimely.
Finally, with respect to Mr. Vigos' contention that the time for
filing his workers' compensation claim was "'equitably tolled" while
he pursued his right to Social Security disability compensation,
Mr. Vigos admits that this principle has not been accepted before
in Utah. The Industrial Commission declines to apply it now, since
±t is directly contrary to the provisions of §35-1-98(2).

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
J. DAVID VIGOS
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QEDER
The Industrial Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and
denies Mr. Vigos' motion for review. It is so ordered.
Dated this^ff day of March, 1996.

Colleen S. Colton
Commissioner

NOTICE OF APPEAL RIgHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this
order by filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial
Commission
within
20 days of the date
of .this order.
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of
Appeals by filing a petition for review with that court within 3 0
days of the date of this order.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion
For Review in the matter of J. David Vigos, Case No. 95-0597, was
mailed first class postage prepaid this ^ X day of March, 1995, to
the following:
J. DAVID VIGOS
364 0 AURORA CIRCLE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84124EUGENE C. MILLER JR.
ATTORNEY AT LAW
40 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE, SUITE 300
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111
RICHARD G. SUMSION
ATTORNEY AT LAW
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84107

Adell Butler-Mitchell
Support Specialist
Industrial Commission of Utah
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r^ir^i^r?rr'r'INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No.

95599

J. DAVID VIGOS,
Applicant,
vs.
MOUNTAINLAND BUILDERS
INC.,and/or WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND,
Defendants.

*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

On July 11, 1995 the applicant filed a claim for temporary
total compensation and permanent total disability benefits in the
above-entitled matter, alleging the same are the result of the
industrial accident of October 12, 1988. Thereafter, the defendant
raised the statute of limitations defense of Section 35-1-99(3),
Utah Code Annotated. Section 99 requires that a claim for weekly
compensation benefits must be filed within six (6) years of the
date of the accident or the claim is wholly barred. In this case,
the file indicates that the applicant was paid temporary total
disability by the defedants for the period October 14, 1988 to May
8, 1989. The defendants also last paid medical expenses for the
applicants claim in July of 1989.
Herein, the applicant filed his claims more than 6 years after
the accident, namely on July 11, 1995, when the same should
have
been
filed
no
later
than
October
13,
1994.
Therefore, as a matter of law the claims for permanent total
disability and temporary total disability benefits must' be denied
as required by the foregoing statute, Section 99.
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good cause for
dismissing the claim,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the claim of the Applicant
for permanent total and temporary total disability benefits be, and
the same is hereby, dismissed with prejudice.

J. DAVID VIGOS
ORDER
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the
date hereof# specifying in detail the particular errors and
objections, and, unless so filed this Order shall be final and not
subject to further review or appeal. In the event a Motion for
Review is timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days
from the date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b12(2), Utah Code Annotated.
DATED this 18th day of September,1995.

